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COMMENTARIES
CYBERIAN SIGNALS
Steven A. Hetcher*
INTRODUCTION
In Law and Social Norms,' Eric Posner offers an original and
important theory of the emergence of norms. According to Posner,
norms are collections of signals. He develops his signaling ac-
count in a variety of contexts, including criminal law, family law,
political participation, and racial discrimination. This article ex-
tends Posner's theory to cyberspace, a domain of social organiza-
tion not touched on in Posner's book. In particular, I will test
Posner's theory by examining how well it explains the emergence
of Web site privacy norms.2 Part One will examine signaling the-
ory. Part Two will explore privacy norms in some detail, and Part
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. I wish to thank
Robert Rasmussen for taking the time on numerous occasions to discuss signaling theory
and other issues that undergird the analysis in this article. I am grateful for the expert
research assistance of Janet Hirt and Angela Vitale.
1. Easc A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NOimS (2000).
2. There is some reason to doubt that effective norms will form in cyberspace. See
Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyperspace, 35 JURIAM-RICS J. 311, 313-14 (1995) ("In-
formal social norms worked fairly well when the Internet community was small and rela-
tively insular.... The addition of fifteen million new users to the Internet in the last dec-
ade may have made private ordering impossible, except in a few specialized corners of
cyberspace."). There are a number of competing accounts of norms. One means of evaluat-
ing the merits of these accounts is to see how they handle particular concrete occasions in
which norms have emerged. Ellickson has noted the importance of case studies for the fur-
ther development of the law and norms approach. See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Eco-
nomics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUiD. 537, 551 (1998).
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Three then will apply signaling theory to privacy norms.' The
conclusion states that these new norms are not best understood
as collections of signals.
I. SIGNALING DISCOUNT RATES
Posner argues that social norms are sets of rational acts
whereby individuals seek to signal to others that they have low
discount rates and hence that they would be good cooperative
partners.4 According to Posner, individuals need to signal that
they value the future sufficiently such that they would be willing
to forgo the immediate benefits of defecting in order to derive the
future benefits of a sustained cooperative relationship.' Posner
makes clear, however, that signaling is an activity distinct from
cooperative behavior itself.6 He writes:
Defection in cooperative endeavors is deterred by fear of reputational
injury, but the signaling behavior independently gives rise to forms
of collective action that can be of great significance. People who care
about future payoffs not only resist the temptation to cheat in a rela-
tionship; they signal their ability to resist the temptation to cheat by
conforming to styles of dress, speech, conduct, and discrimination.
7
As this quote indicates, on Posner's account, signaling allows
actors to communicate prior to the establishment of a cooperative
relationship that they have the "ability to resist the temptation"
to defect in the current game.' Thus, signaling logically occurs
prior to actual rational acts of cooperation. It is signaling that
3. Robert Ellickson's path-breaking book on law and norms devotes the first six
chapters to a detailed sociological survey of the norms of Shasta County, California, before
turning to a theoretical analysis. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
4. POSNER, supra note 1, at 5. Posner's book develops a "general model of nonlegal
cooperation," which consists of a "signaling game in which people engage in behavioral
regularities in order to show that they are desirable partners in cooperative endeavors."
Id. Posner describes behavioral regularities used in this way to signal cooperative intent
as "social norms." Id. As this quote indicates, Posner appears to believe that his signaling
account provides a general account of social norms.
5. Id. at 18-19.
6. Id. at5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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may afford actors better opportunities for cooperative relation-
ships at some later date
Whether cooperation occurs depends in part on the discount
rates of the actors.' ° The more one discounts the future, the less
likely one is to forgo the immediate one-time benefit gained from
defection in favor of the delayed benefit of future cooperation."
Posner refers to those with low discount rates as "good types" and
those with high discount rates as "bad types."12
To distinguish themselves from bad types, good types engage in ac-
tions that are called "signals." Signals reveal type if only the good
types, and not the bad types, can afford to send them, and everyone
knows this. Because a good type is a person who values future re-
turns more than a bad type does, one signal is to incur large, observ-
able costs prior to entering a relationship. For example, if a good
type values a future payoff of 10 at a 10 percent discount and a bad
type values the same payoff at a 30 percent discount, the good type
can distinguish himself by incurring an otherwise uncompensated
cost of 8 .... 13
The goal, then, in searching for cooperative partners by watch-
ing signals is to find people with low discount rates. Accordingly,
actors will seek to convince others that they have low discount
rates.'4 Thus, reputation plays a crucial role in Posner's account,
just as it does in the standard account of cooperation.'" Signaling,
9. See id.
10. See id. at 14-15.
11. See id. at 15 ("Then as long as each player cares enough about his payoffs in fu-
ture rounds-that is, he has a low discount rate--he will cooperate rather than defect in
each round.").
12. See id. at 18 ("Holding everything else equal, a good type is more likely to cooper-
ate in a repeated prisoner's dilemma than a bad type is, because the good type cares more
about the future payoffs that are lost if cooperation fails."). The bipolar typology is, as
Posner notes, a methodological convenience. Id. at 19. Clearly, in reality there are not
simply two types of preferences but rather a continuous set of preferences when it comes
to discounting the future. Id. Interestingly, Posner implicitly draws a positive correlation
between good and bad types in his sense of these terms and in the ordinary moral sense of
these terms. He writes: "The reader should be reminded that a 'good' or 'bad' type is not
necessarily a good or bad person; the label refers to the beliefs of those within the group
about the hidden characteristics of others." Id. at 25.
13. Id. at 19.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 12-13. Reputation is a key element in the standard account of cooperation
in prisoner's dilemma ("PD") games. While rational actors prefer to defect in a single-shot
PD game, they may cooperate when repeated play is possible in order to establish a repu-
tation as cooperators such that others may feel safe in entering into cooperative relation-
ships with them. See ELLicKSON, supra note 3, at 180-81.
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according to Posner, is a means of establishing a reputation as a
cooperator." He writes: "One wants a general reputation as a 'co-
operator,' a person with a low discount rate, and one establishes
that reputation both by declining to cheat in repeated games and
by sending signals at every opportunity."17 Individuals attempt to
signal that they are good types and attempt to discern that others
are good types, judging by the signals they are sending.'
On Posner's account, signals are arbitrary in the sense that
any behavior could potentially come to serve as a signal as long as
the behavior is observable and has an associated cost.'9 Because
the signal is costly, some actors-the bad types-will sometimes
be prudentially excluded from sending it.2" The result will be a
separating equilibrium in which good types act in one manner
and bad types act in another.2' For example, a good type may be
more willing to incur a greater cost from giving a gift in the early
period of a relationship than a bad type.22 The less one discounts
the future benefits of the relationship, the more one is willing to
spend early on in order to signal one's low discount rate to foster
a cooperative relationship.23 Social norms, then, are simply the
patterns of behavior that result as the equilibrium outcomes of
various signaling games.
According to Posner, norms have dynamic properties as well.24
Once norms have been established, there will continue to be
forces at play pushing toward new norms. Bad types will often
seek to pool with good types in order to benefit from the signal's
power to make others think that the bad type is in fact a good
type.25 However, this in turn may lead to good types attempting
16. POSNER, supra note 1, at 21.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 29 ("The cooperation game requires that the signal be costly, but nothing
about the game dictates the form of the signal. As long as an action is both actually and
apparently costly, it can serve as a signal that the sender belongs to the good type."); see
also id. at 22-23 ("[Slignals are costly and observable actions with no necessary or intrin-
sic connections to the beliefs that they provoke.").
20. Id. at 19.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 71 (discussing engagement rings as an example of signaling in court-
ships).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 21.
25. Posner explains that
[slignals do not always result in a separating equilibrium. Sometimes an ac-
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to migrate to new norms in order to avoid the muddying of the old
signal by the bad types. With Posner's signaling theory in mind,
consider next the following descriptive account of the emergence
of Web site privacy norms.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF ONLINE PRIVACY NORMS
A. Creating Demand for Online Privacy
The norms governing personal data interactions between con-
sumers and Web sites have changed dramatically in the past few
years. Increasingly, there is a moral sensitivity among consumers
regarding the collection and use of their personal data by Web
sites." Consumers now perceive a general right to privacy in cy-
berspace that includes respectful treatment of their personal
data. Web sites increasingly recognize this sense of entitlement.
One Internet entrepreneur summarized the situation as follows:
"'Companies used to think of customer data as theirs. They're
starting to realize they're really custodians, and the customer
controls the information."'28 In other words, the social meaning of
personal data collection has changed from a morally neutral to a
morally charged status.29 This change is due to the actions of pri-
tion that served to separate types at time 1 will, because of an exogenous
shift in costs, fail to separate them at time 2. If the cost of the signal falls,
bad types might join in (they "pool"), in the hope that good types will infer
that they (the bad types) are in fact good; or good types will stop sending the
signal, because they realize that the bad types can join in, and thus observers
cannot distinguish the good from the bad on the basis of who sends the sig-
nal.
Id. at 19-20.
26. Id. at 19-21.
27. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1465
(2000). The connection between the collection of personal data and personal privacy is
straightforward; the more personal data that Web sites collect, store, and use, the less pri-
vacy that data subjects have. There are two broad categories of personal data: (1) informa-
tion that can be used to identify consumers ("personal identifying information," including
name and postal or e-mail address); and (2) demographic and preference information (in-
cluding age, gender, income level, hobbies, and interests). FEDERAL TRADE COAM]ISSION,
PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 20 (June 1998) [hereinafter FTC 1998 PRIVACY
REPORT], available at http://vww.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf; Jessica Litman,
Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1283-86 (2000).
28. Paul Davidson, Marketing Gurus Clash on Internet Privacy Rules, USA TODAY,
Apr. 27, 2001, at 1B (quoting Hans Peter Brondmo).
29. See, e.g., The End of Privacy, THE ECONOMIST, May 1, 1999, at 21; Adam L.
Penenberg, The End of Privacy, FORBES, Nov. 29, 1999, at 182-83; Jared Sandberg, Losing
2002]
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vacy norm proselytizers and other norm entrepreneurs who pos-
sessed an interest in promoting online privacy.3 °
The normative debate that increasingly surrounds data collec-
tion practices is evidence that consumers are developing a more
complex understanding of Web site activities. Most important, in-
teractions between Web sites and their visitors are framed in
terms of privacy.3 In particular, commercial data collection is
widely understood to raise concerns for a new species of privacy:
informational privacy or data privacy." Not long ago, these ex-
panded privacy concepts did not exist in either popular discourse
or the lexicon of normative theory.
The more consumers feel entitled to data privacy, the greater
their sense of moral outrage at Web sites that fail to respect this
entitlement. In terms of the emerging moral discourse for govern-
ing online personal data, Web sites ought to respect the data pri-
vacy entitlements of consumers.33 Web sites that do so may earn
Your Good Name Online, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1999, at 56; Celia Santander, Web-Site
Privacy Policies Aren't Created Equal, WEB FIN., Dec. 11, 2000. Opinion polls show in-
creasing public concern with respect to online privacy. See Glenn R. Simpson, E-Commerce
Firms Sort to Rethink Opposition to Privacy Regulation as Abuses, Anger Rise, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 6, 2000, at A24. A recent poll found that ninety-two percent of Internet users were
uncomfortable about Web sites sharing personal information with other sites. Business
Week/Harris Poll: A Growing Threat, Bus. WK. ONLINE (Mar. 20, 2000), at
http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_12/b3673010.htm.
30. See Steven A. Hetcher, Norm Proselytizers Create a Privacy Entitlement in Cyber-
space, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 880 (2001). "Norm proselytizers promote norms for
moral reasons that they themselves accept." Id. at 935 n.4. Norm proselytizers, then, are a
sub-category of norm entrepreneurs. Norm entrepreneurs are actors who promote norma-
tive change. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
909 (1996). See generally Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 1, 15 (2000).
31. Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the European Union and
the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173, 179 (1999) ('Privacy will be to the information
economy of the next century what consumer protection and environmental concerns have
been to the industrial society of the 20th century.'" (quoting Marc Rotenberg)).
32. See Diane McDougall, Embrace Privacy, CMA MGMT., Nov. 1, 1999, at 13 ("Con-
cern about informational privacy in the marketplace has risen. ").
33. See Jeri Clausing, Can Internet Advertisers Police Themselves? Washington Re-
mains Unconvinced, N.Y. TiMES, June 14, 2000, at CIO ("Marc Rotenberg, director of the
Electronic Privacy Information Center, said Internet users should have the choice up front
about whether they want companies collecting information about them online. And they
should be able to have their profiles deleted upon request."); Edward J. Markey, We Must
Act Soon to Protect Online Privacy, THE HILL, Feb. 7, 2001.
Some of the UKIs popular internet banks are eager to point out their respect
for customer privacy. 'We do not passively track visitors to our website," says
Richard Thackray, UK country manager for first-e. "Once a customer is
signed up, we keep records of all communications and may use the informa-
20021 CYBERIAN SIGNALS
the trust and confidence of consumers, while Web sites that do not
may be subject to informal sanctioning by consumers. 4
Privacy proselytizers have acted as industry watchdogs and
legislative proponents. 5 They were instrumental in lobbying for
tion for special offers, but we don't trade customer information without their
prior consent."
David Cohen, Be Sure You Never Take a Cookie from Strangers, THE GUARDIAN (London),
Apr. 1, 2000, at 22.
34. See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125,
1169 (2000) ("The more enlightened private sector firms are coming to realize that fuller
adherence to privacy principles will promote consumer trust which will, in turn, promote
commerce.").
In the practical terms of the online environment, however, consumers have
the option of choice. Unlike forced commercial interactions with utility-like
cable providers, consumers may interact only with those websites that are to
their liking. Websites that post adequate privacy policies, and adhere to
them, will earn consumer trust and consumer dollars. Online businesses are
increasingly aware of that concern, and will compete in the arena of privacy
service in the same manner in which they compete on terms such as price.
Shaun A. Sparks, The Direct Marketing Model and Virtual Identity: Why the United States
Should Not Create Legislative Controls on the Use of Online Consumer Personal Data, 18
DIcK. J. INT'L L. 517, 549 (2000) (citation omitted).
That's not to say that L.L. Bean executives think that people are ready to
give up their privacy. To the contrary, L.L. Bean believes that, as always,
people are willing to share private information with those they trust, and it
believes that it has its customers' trust. The company may be right. It reports
that customers love the convenience. In fact, one recent caller was so
charmed by the personal treatment that she thought the saleswoman recog-
nized her voice.
"That's a trusting relationship with that business," said Marc Rotenberg,
executive director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a privacy ad-
vocacy group in Washington. Mr. Rotenberg said L.L. Bean's customers had
faith that the company would not abuse the information by reselling it.
Katie Hafner, Do You Know Who's Watching You? Do You Care?, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 11,
1999, at G1.
35. Ethical hackers and corporate watchdogs have been highly successful in discover-
ing dubious Web site practices. Among the best examples of privacy activism targeting
private companies surrounded DoubleClick's acquisition of Abacus Direct. Its intention
was, contrary to earlier representations, to combine the online and offline personal data
from both enterprises. The advocacy community brought the plan to the attention of the
media, which gave generous attention to the story. The price of DoubleClick's stock
dropped precipitously as the story unfolded in the press, destroying billions of dollars in
the company's market capitalization. The company has subsequently been embroiled in
lawsuits and subjected to a heightened level of scrutiny from privacy activists and the
FTC. See Jeri Clausing, Privacy Advocates Fault New DoubleClick Service, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2000, at C2; Privacy on the Internet, N.Y. TItES, Feb. 22, 2000, at A22; Diane
Anderson & Keith Perine, Privacy Issue Makes DoubleClick a Target, INDUSTRY
STANDARD, at http://wwwv.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,9480,00.html (Feb. 3, 2000); Will
Rodger, Activists Charge DoubleClick Double Cross, USAToday.com (June 7, 2000), at
http://wwv.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cth2ll.htm; see also Junkbusters Urges Vigilance
from FTC and Parents to Protect Children from Corporate Surveillance and Manipulation,
BUS. WIRE, Apr. 20, 1999:
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the enactment of the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act
("COPPA"). 36 More recently, they have pushed for an extension of
this regulatory framework to adults.
Privacy proselytizers have attempted to educate the public and
the media about the dangers of emerging data collection prac-
tices. They have also sought to change these groups' moral per-
spective regarding personal data by citing a relationship of re-
sponsibility between the data practices of Web sites and
consumers' loss of privacy. Privacy proselytizers have steadfastly
refused to dismiss consumer privacy loss as a necessary casualty
of the emergence of electronic commerce.
Proponents of privacy espouse a number of concrete norms,
most notably notice, consent, access, security, and enforcement. At
least in public discourse, some members of the Web site industry
accept the requirement of notice. The second most often men-
tioned requirement of data privacy is some form of consent. There
is great disagreement, however, regarding the appropriate defini-
Junkbusters Corp. President Jason Catlett today urged Federal regulators
and parents to stand firm against marketers who want to use the Internet to
extract information from the nation's children. "From Microsoft to the 'young
investor' site that asked kids to report on their parents' financial assets,
Internet companies have demonstrated they cannot be trusted to respect
anyone's privacy. Parents and regulators must vigorously defend our children
against the electronic molestation of their identities," Catlett said.
Id.; Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2000, Digital Privacy Act of 2000 and Notice
of Electronic Monitoring Act: Hearing on H.R. 5018, H.R. 4987, & H.R. 4908 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 65-71
(2000) (statement of Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, EPIC); Cyber Attacks: The Na-
tional Protection Plan and Its Privacy Implications: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Tech., Terrorism, and Gov't Info. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 46-53
(2000) (statement of Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, EPIC); Security and Freedom
Through Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 695 Before the Subcomm. on Courts &
Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 113-18 (1997) (state-
ment of Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, EPIC).
36. Gwen Carleton, Privacy, for the Sake of the Children, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison,
Wis.), June 30, 2000, at 1D ("COPPA... went into effect on April 21. The law's enactment
marked a triumph for children's advocates, who have agitated since the mid-1990s for ba-
sic protections for the Internet's youngest users.").
37. See Pamela Mendels, New Serious Side to Child's Play on the Web, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1998, at A20 ("Privacy advocates have raised different concerns about the law.
Marc Rotenberg... favors online privacy protections for adults, too, and would have pre-
ferred legislation based not on parental consent, but on the idea of privacy for all."); Leslie
Miller, Children's Crusade Advocates Work Behind the Scenes to Fight the 'Powerful
Forces' of Marketers Who Target Kids' Privacy in New Media, USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 1999,
at 4D ('It's a parental notification law, which has some pluses and some minuses,' says
Marc Rotenberg .... 'What we really need is a base-line privacy bill for all users of the
Internet.").
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tion of consent in the context of Web site data gathering." In an
opt-out regime, personal data will automatically be collected
unless a consumer specifically acts to indicate otherwise.39 Indus-
try groups such as the Online Privacy Alliance have promoted an
opt-out policy as a minimum requirement for members." By con-
trast, in an opt-in regime, the default is that personal data will
not be collected unless the consumer explicitly agrees.41 Privacy
advocates are typically advocates of an opt-in policy.42
Thomas Cooley defined privacy as the right to be let alone.
Respect for consumer privacy online cannot mean that Web sites
should literally leave consumers alone: consumers are the ones
who visit Web sites. Instead, the core meaning of privacy in the
context of Web site personal data practices is that the Web site
should leave the visitor's data alone, except to the extent the visi-
tor consents to her personal data being collected and used. When
38. Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible and Invisible Worlds: United States
Privacy Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 357, 370
(2000).
Whether Internet users in the United States must be asked to consent to
each appropriation of information about their on-line activities (opt-in) or,
rather, whether Internet users have implicitly consented to general use of
digitized profiles of their Internet activities so that each Internet user must
expressly withdraw consent to sale of such information (opt-out), remains a
very contentious privacy issue.
Id. See generally Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for
Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033 (1999).
39. See Amy Borrus, The Stage Seems Set for Net Privacy Rules This Year, Bus. WK.,
Mar. 5, 2001, at 51 ("Opt-in is a far higher hurdle than opt-out, which allows a company to
gather data until a consumer orders it to stop.").
40. See Online Privacy Alliance, Guidelines for Online Privacy Policies, at http/Avww.
privacyalliance.orgfresources/ppguidelines.shtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2002). The Alliance
is a coalition of more than eighty companies and trade associations formed in early 1998 to
encourage self-regulation of data privacy.
41. Borrus, supra note 39, at 51.
42. Some are hopeful that President Bush will push for "opt-in" rules.
[P]rivacy hawks will push for so-called "opt-in" rules that require companies
to get users' prior consent before collecting or sharing personal info. Opt-in is
a far higher hurdle than opt-out, which allows a company to gather data until
a consumer orders it to stop.
Privacy gurus hope President Bush will be their strongest ally. As a can-
didate, Bush said customers "should be allowed to opt in" to information shar-
ing. Says Rotenberg: "This is one campaign promise we're not going to forget."
Id.
43. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888). Fair information practices al-
low each of us to tell the world to mind its own business. See William Safire, Stalking the
Internet, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2000, at A15. See generally Kutz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
2002]
336 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:327
a consumer allows her data to be collected and used, she will have
less informational privacy as a result. While this collection and
use would reduce privacy, it would not be an instance of the Web
site disrespecting the visitor because the collection and use oc-
curred with the visitor's consent.44 The central moral imperative
then is to gather and use a visitor's personal data in a manner
that does not violate her ability to control the flow of such data.
In addition to notice and consent, norm proselytizers have
promoted a right of access to one's personal data residing on the
databases of Web sites.45 A fourth element of the general right to
data privacy is security for personal data residing in databases of
commercial firms.46 If personal data is easily accessible to hackers
or corporate affiliates, the Web site may be indirectly responsible
for injuring the consumer whose data is stored with the Web site,
even if the Web site is not itself guilty of any active wrongdoing.
Finally, the effectiveness of the foregoing privacy protections is
dependent upon implementation of an enforcement principle,
which requires sanctions for noncompliance with fair information
practices.
44. See John Walsh, Websites with a Personal Touch, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at 6
("Do consumers mind being asked to part with information in order to receive personalised
goods and services? Most early research would suggest that they do not, so long as they
perceive a benefit, such as reading a newspaper for free or saving time."); Fred 0. Wil-
liams, Area Man Wins Cybercash, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 28, 2000, at llC ("[Clonsumers
appear willing to exchange personal data for free prizes and cash. .. ").
45. Consumer security remains high on the list of privacy advocates.
For the privacy advocates, the proliferation of privacy-invading technolog[y]
means that Congress should pass privacy legislation rather than forcing con-
sumers to confront privacy questions each time a new technology is intro-
duced. "Every new service offering raises new privacy issues because Con-
gress and the administration are reluctant to apply a new privacy standard,"
said Rotenberg.
He praised the Edwards bill, which would require companies that make
online tracking software to inform users and give them the right to access
their personal data, as "probably higher up the curve in terms of good privacy
legislation" than most.
Drew Clark, Activists Unite to Push for Stronger Privacy Laws, NAT'L J. TECH. DAILY, at
http://nationaljoumal.com/pubs/techdaily (Jan. 30, 2001).
46. See Stewart Baker, Regulating Technology for Law Enforcement, 4 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 53, 53 (1999).
If you are going to protect communications from cyberterrorism, if you are go-
ing to prevent people from breaking into computers and stealing valuable in-
formation, and if you are going to trust your life and your personal data to a
computer, you want guarantees that the information will be kept secure.
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These five elements of the general right to data privacy are ac-
curately grouped under the second-order norm that people have a
right of reasonable control over their personal data. Note that
this norm does not entail a consumer right to ownership of indi-
vidual personal data.' If consumers owned their personal data,
presumably they could sell it. Once alienated, the consumer
would have no more claim to it than a piece of sold real property.
The rights discussed above may best be treated as inalienable.48
An important implication follows from the activities of privacy
proselytizers in creating a sense of consumer entitlement to per-
sonal data. The more strongly consumers feel about a data pri-
vacy entitlement, the more they will be morally affronted by in-
stances where Web sites infringe upon their privacy. Accordingly,
they will be slower to trust Web sites and more inclined to punish
those that fail to respect consumer privacy.
While the privacy activists may not themselves have the re-
sources to push for universal conformity to respectful norms,
these norms have taken on a life of their own. Other norm entre-
preneurs increasingly find it is in their interest to promote pri-
vacy norms. This has most conspicuously been true for the Fed-
eral Trade Commission ("FTC") and a number of firms that
market privacy-related software.49
Since the mid-1990s, the FTC has reinforced the privacy-
promoting efforts of the privacy proselytizers. 0 The FTC acts
pursuant to its authority under the Federal Trade Commission
Act,5 which mandates that the agency address "unfair" and "de-
ceptive" trade practices.52 The FTC casts Web site data-gathering
47. Some commentators have advocated ownership of one's personal data as the best
means to secure the set of rights entailed by the second-order right to data privacy. See,
e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63
(1999). Such a right would be in tension with the First Amendment.
48. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 34, at 1143 ("If information privacy is a civil lib-
erty, it may make no more sense to propertize personal data than to commodify voting
rights.").
49. See generally Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2041 (2000).
50. Id.
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000).
52. Id. § 45(a)(1). The FTC prosecutes "[u]nfair methods of competition ... and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." Id. The FTC has the authority to
file suits for violations of section 45(a)(1). See id. § 57(a). The FTC is "empowered and di-
rected" to create rules to prohibit deceptive or unfair practice prevalent in certain indus-
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practices as potentially unfair and deceptive.53 In particular, the
agency has borrowed the various specific privacy protection
measures supported by the privacy activists-notice, consent, ac-
cess, security, enforcement-and shrouded them in the rhetoric of
fairness.54 When Web sites adopt the FTC's suggestion and seek
to implement the fair information practices via privacy policies,
the FTC's regulatory grasp is enhanced.55 Furthermore, once Web
sites make representations to consumers regarding their prac-
tices, the FTC has a claim to jurisdiction if the Web sites behave
differently.56
Software vendors, marketing so-called privacy solutions, have
recently emerged as a new type of privacy norm entrepreneur.57
Privacy solutions are software that users or Web sites can install
in order to create a more privacy-respecting online environment.
While Web sites are typically the direct purchasers of these prod-
ucts, software developers also advertise their products to con-
sumers. As more advertisements foster moral concern among con-
sumers, greater social pressure toward increased privacy
tries. Id. § 45(a)(2).
53. Note that the FTC's framework for regulating unfair practices does not require
ownership of personal data. The fact that data subjects may have de facto control over
their data is enough to generate an instance of an unfair or deceptive trade practice. This
means that the agency may gain jurisdiction over Web site activities without a change in
the intellectual property status of personal data.
54. FTC 1998 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 27, at 7. The FTC explicitly states that it
takes its normative framework from the privacy policy community. Id. at 48 n.27.
55. See Hetcher, supra note 49, at 2057.
56. The FTC's role in helping to moralize the social meaning of data collection can be
understood in public choice terms as an effort to extend the agency's purview over the bur-
geoning Web site industry. Elsewhere, I have argued that public choice theory provides a
plausible explanation for the agency's involvement: the FTC has sought to become the
leading federal agency regulating online activities as a means of extending its regulatory
grasp to the Internet. Id. at 2053.
57. See John Graubert & Jill Coleman, Consumer Protection and Antitrust Enforce-
ment at the Speed of Light: The FTC Meets the Internet, 25 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 275, 290 (1999);
P3P: Just a Start, ZDWIRE, July 17, 2000, available at 2000 WL 18178259 ("There's no
disputing that privacy has emerged as a leading issue of the Internet age. A whole indus-
try is springing up around it, with software and service providers rushing to offer the lat-
est and greatest solution for protecting an individual's personal information and identity
online.").
In the case of Internet privacy, several technologies potentially capable of
protecting the online privacy of consumers are evidently already on the mar-
ket or under development. Technology-based privacy solutions may eventu-
ally provide consumers with the confidence and security that they need to
conduct business on the Internet on a global scale.
Graubert & Coleman, supra, at 290.
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protection will be exerted on the Web site industry." Advertise-
ments of this sort will likely influence privacy norms by further
stoking consumer privacy concerns and the corresponding enti-
tlement to personal data. Public opinion likely will be further gal-
vanized in the direction of greater demand for more respectful
Web site privacy practices. For Web sites at the margin, it may
now make sense to switch to more respectful norms.
B. Meeting the Demand for Online Privacy
The previous section analyzed a surge in the demand for pri-
vacy among consumers due to the efforts of norm proselytizers
and norm entrepreneurs. This section will examine the impact of
this increase in demand on the level of supply. Generally, when
demand for a good or service increases, the supply increases as
well. Thus, barring special circumstances, one would expect that
the increase in demand for personal data privacy online would
produce an increase in supply. All things being equal, Web sites
that can cheaply supply privacy will be more inclined to do so,
while Web sites for which it is more expensive would tend to pro-
vide less privacy." In addition, Web sites whose customers are
58. See, e.g., Zeroknowledge, Advertisement, WIRED, Aug. 2000, at 5-6. The ad depicts
an average Internet user, unremarkable except for the bar code emblazoned on her neck.
The text consists of a small number of rhetorical statements made by a representative
online consumer to the Web site industry: "I AM NOT A PIECE OF YOUR INVENTORY. I
am not a pair of eyeballs to be captured or a consumer profile to be sold .... I will not be
bartered, traded or sold." Id. These phrases play on current Web site industry jargon, in
which customer visits are referred to as "capturing eyeballs," and personal data is
amassed into "consumer profiles." The import of the advertisement is that typical Web
sites currently treat people not as individuals, but instead as "inventory" that can be bar-
coded and bartered or as "eyeballs" that can be "captured." The advertisement then con-
trasts these industry attitudes with the normatively acceptable position as portrayed by a
representative consumer speaking to the Web site industry: "I am an individual and you
will respect my privacy." Id. The final claim is that "On the Net I am in control." Id. By
demanding her moral rights when it comes to online privacy, the woman in the ad admon-
ishes the reader to do the same.
59. Some relevant factors include the extent to which the use of personal data plays a
central role in the business model of a particular Web site and the site's relative cost
structure for collecting, storing, processing, and manipulating data. For example, despite
its high profile, Amazon recently announced that it was changing its privacy policy in a
manner that was less favorable to consumer privacy interests. Amazon Draws Fire for
DVD Pricing Test, Privacy Policy Change, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2000, at B4. Presumably
Amazon calculated that despite the possible negative impact on its reputation as a re-
specter of privacy, it was worth it to make the change of practice due to the important role
that consumer data plays in its business model. EBay also recently changed its policy in a
consumer-unfriendly fashion. Ebay Says It May Sell Information on Users in Event of Ac-
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more demanding of privacy will be more likely to provide greater
privacy protections.6 °
Despite the increase in demand for respect, there is great con-
troversy as to whether there has been an increase in the respect
of privacy. The industry claims to be responsive to consumer con-
cern for privacy." Many privacy advocates, however, strongly dis-
agree. Jessica Litman has stated that industry attempts at self-
regulation have been an "abject failure."62 Similarly, Jason Cat-
lett of Junkbusters, a privacy advocacy organization, has re-
marked that, "'Ithe stated policies of most big shopping sites run
the gamut from bad to atrocious.' 63 However, not all commenta-
tors sympathetic to consumer privacy concerns are this critical. In
the same symposium in which Litman made her remarks, Pamela
Samuelson noted that privacy policies are improving.64
The following discussion examines the data-regarding norms
that have been adopted by Web sites in their privacy policies.
Next, I will critically evaluate these efforts by Web sites in order
to better judge the merit of the critic's charges of duplicity. Fol-
lowing this discussion, Part Three will examine whether Posner's
theory lends insight into this response on the part of Web sites.
1. The Features and Content of Current Web Site Privacy
Policies
Web site privacy policies are a recent phenomenon, having
quisition, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2001, at B7.
60. For example, health-related sites and financial sites appear to provide higher lev-
els of privacy. This appears to be responsive to consumer demand. See Stephanie Olsen &
Patrick Ross, Studies Out to Debunk Privacy Legislation, CNET NEWS.COM (May 8, 2001),
at http://news.cnet.comlnews/0-1005-200-5865212.html (reporting that Rep. Michael
Doyle, D-Penn., "said consumers seemed more concerned with financial and medical pri-
vacy than with other types").
61. See Sandeep Junnarkar, FTC Faces Suit for Access to Privacy Complaints, CNET
NEWS.COM (Oct. 12, 1999), at http://news.com.com/news/2100-1001-231268.html. "A large
part of the privacy debate in the last couple of years has centered around industry claims
that there are adequate systems in place to deal with privacy problems." Id. (quoting
David Sobel, General Counsel of the Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC")).
62. Litman, supra note 27, at 1287.
63. Stefanie Olsen, Top Web Sites Compromise Consumer Privacy, CNET NEWS.COM
(Dec. 17, 1999), at http://news.cnet.com/news/2100-1017-234631.html.
64. Samuelson, supra note 34, at 1161. "[Tlhere is some evidence that American-based
commercial Web sites provide more notice about privacy policies now than they did a year
ago. Some progress also continues in implementation of the other principles .... " Id.
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emerged in the late 1990s. The universal feature of these privacy
policies is that they are accessible as a link from the home page of
many Web sites. Many sites also have links to their privacy policy
from areas within the site, such as from internal pages that re-
quest customer data. Privacy policies range from a half-page to
ten pages in length. In terms of their apparent intent and rhe-
torical structure, privacy policies are hybrid documents that re-
flect both public relations and legal concerns. On the one hand,
privacy policies often have a friendly, reassuring tone that seems
motivated by an attempt to create an air of intimacy between the
site and its users. On the other hand, privacy policies increas-
ingly are adopting a legalistic tone.
Privacy policies typically begin with some warm and fuzzy lan-
guage about the online entity's respect for its users' privacy.
Typical in this regard are statements such as, "[a]t 1-800-
FLOWERS.COM, we recognize and respect the importance of
maintaining the privacy of our customers and members .. .,,6"
Some of the more scrupulous sites explicitly acknowledge the pri-
vacy rights of users in their opening remarks. Wal-Mart's privacy
policy states, "[wle believe that you have a right to know, before
shopping at Walmart.com or at any other time, exactly what in-
formation we might collect from you, why we collect it and how
we use it."66 Nike's privacy policy begins, "Nike is committed to
respecting the privacy rights of Web site visitors." 7
Some sites state that their goal is to create a relationship of
confidence and trust with consumers. The Walt Disney privacy
policy begins, "[the Walt Disney Internet Group is committed to
helping you make the most of your free time on the Internet
within a trusted environment .... We hope that this disclosure
will help increase your confidence in our sites and enhance your
experience on the Internet."" The introduction to the Wal-Mart
65. About 1-800-FLOWERS.COM Your Privacy, at http/wwv.1800flowers.
comlflowerslsecurity/index.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
66. Walmart.com Privacy Policy, at http:/wwv.walmart.comcservicelca~sp-privacy
policy.gsp (last visited Apr. 4, 2002). Wal-Mart has an exemplary privacy policy. Sites of
old economy firms like Wal-Mart are of particular interest, as they demonstrate the pene-
tration of the growing ethos of Internet privacy beyond the now outdated notion of the
dot.com economy. The Internet was never a marketplace but rather a technology platform.
67. Nike's Online Privacy Policy, at http://niketown.nike.com/info/privacy.jhtml?item
=privacy (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
68. Disney Online Privacy Policy, at http'/disney.go.comilegal/privacy-policy.html
(last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
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privacy policy states that "[t]he security of your personal informa-
tion is very important to us.... We value your trust very highly,
and pledge to you, our customer, that we will work to protect the
security and privacy of any personal information you provide to
us and that your personal information will only be used as set
forth in this [Privacy] Policy."69 Sears.com states, "[w]e value the
trust you place in Sears, Roebuck and Co ..... We want to ensure
that you understand what information we gather about you, how
we use it, and the safeguards we have in place in order to protect
it. 7
0
On the whole, however, privacy policies are increasingly em-
ploying more overtly legalistic formulations. 7' For example,
Weather.com states, "This statement and the policies outlined
here are not intended to and do not give you any contractual or
other legal rights."" The Toyota privacy policy in part reads,
"Toyota shall not be responsible for any harm that you or any
person may suffer as a result of a breach of confidentiality in re-
spect to your use of this site or any information you transmitted
to this site."73 Toyota's harsh legalistic tone illustrates the tension
between a privacy policy crafted as a document meant to create
trust in users, and as a legalistic document meant to protect the
company against potential liability. The use of more legalistic
language is perhaps not surprising, given that privacy policies
are starting to play a role in lawsuits.74 If privacy-related law-
suits become more prevalent, the language of privacy policies may
become even more legalistic. 7
5
69. Walmart.com Privacy Policy, supra note 66.
70. Sears, Roebuck and Co. World Wide Web Site Customer Information Privacy Pol-
icy, at http://www.sears.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
71. See Eric Roston, How to Opt Out of Database Sharing; Who's Got Your Number?,
TIME, July 2, 2001, at 46.
72. Weather.com Privacy Statement, at http://www.weather.com/common/home/pri-
vacy.html (last updated July 3, 2001).
73. Toyota.com Privacy Policy, at http://www.toyota.com/html/privacy/index.html (last
visited Apr. 4, 2002). The Privacy Policy also states that "Toyota does not assume any re-
sponsibility for the accuracy, completeness or authenticity of any information contained on
this site. This site and all information and materials contained herein, is provided to you
'as is' without warranty of any kind." Id.
74. See, e.g., Judnick v. DoubleClick, No. JC-4120 (Marin Cty. (Cal.) Super. Ct., filed
May 5, 2000).
75. Currently, the legal status of privacy policies is ambiguous. See Scott Kill-
ingsworth, Minding Your Own Business: Privacy Policies in Principle and in Practice, J.
INTERNET L., Oct. 1999, at 12 (arguing that terms in privacy policies should be treated as
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In the past few years, most Web sites have begun to address
privacy concerns to some extent.76 Web sites are beginning to
adopt a number of common practices. These practices track the
norms that are being promoted by the privacy proselytizers dis-
cussed in the previous section. The following brief survey of the
key elements of a number of Web site privacy policies indicates
just how complex and varied the personal data practices of Web
sites are becoming." It will be necessary to examine these prac-
tices in some detail to better understand the extent to which such
practices are susceptible to, or indeed constituted of, false signal-
ing actions, as Posner's theory may suggest.7"
The provision of notice of a site's personal-data-related activi-
ties is the first of the fair practice principles.79 The principle of
notice is a second-order principle that supports each of the other
principles, as it is only when a user has knowledge of the data-
related activities of a Web site that the user can make informed
decisions about how to interact with the site regarding each of the
other privacy principles. At first glance, notice seems like a
straightforward requirement with which to comply. A site simply
writes down a description of its data-related practices and creates
a link to this text. For some sites with simple and minimal data-
related practices, the provision of straightforward notice is possi-
ble. For example, the Official Madonna Fan Club site privacy pol-
icy, when printed out, is only half a page long and contains three
short paragraphs." The site is able to state straightforwardly,
"[we do not sell, rent or trade your personal information with
contractual). But see, e.g., Weather.com Privacy Statement, supra note 72 ("This statement
and the policies outlined here are not intended to and do not give you any contractual or
other legal rights.").
76. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES
IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, A FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT TO CONGRESS
10 (2000) [hereinafter FTC 2000 PRIVACY REPORT] (discussing that the Commission's sur-
vey findings demonstrate continued improvement with eighty-eight percent of Web sites in
the random sample posting at least one privacy disclosure), available at
http:I/www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
77. See FTC 1998 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 27.
78. Previous studies of privacy policies have provided quantitative measures of chang-
ing Web site practices. See FTC 2000 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 78; see also The George-
town Internet Privacy Policy Study, available at http://msb.edu/faculty/culnanmgipps
home.html (last modified Aug. 11, 2000). While of general interest, these studies do not
lend insight as to whether these changes represent true or feigned respect for privacy.
79. FTC 1998 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 27, at 7.
80. Madonna Fan Club Privacy Statement, at http:/vww.madonnafanclub.com/pri-
vacy.html (last modified Mar. 11, 2002).
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others."81 This site claims it only uses personal data in order to
process commercial transactions, such as merchandise sales and
membership dues. The site also claims not to use cookies or other
passive means of data gathering.1
2
The problem is that the data-related practices of Web sites are
becoming increasingly complex, and this makes notice a more dif-
ficult matter. The first layer of complexity is introduced by means
of the manner in which data is collected. Users understand that
data is being collected from them when the data is explicitly pro-
vided by them. More opaque is data collection by means of cookies
and other ways of so-called "passive" tracking of user online ac-
tivities. 3
For many sites, how the personal data is gathered is the de-
termining factor in whether the data becomes personally identifi-
able information, or personal information, as compared to,
anonymous information. The information that people explicitly
volunteer to the Web site such as their name, address, social se-
curity number, age, etc., is personally identifiable in the sense
that it can be traced back to particular individuals. By contrast,
Web sites collect information through the use of cookies on such
activities as the users' visitation to various sites. Sites typically
state that this information is not personally identifiable.' In
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. Many sites provide definitions of arcane terms such as "cookies" and "IPO ad-
dresses," and explanations of their importance for privacy purposes. Motorola's Web site,
for example, states as follows:
When you come into our site, our server attaches a small text file to your
hard drive-a cookie. Your unique cookie tells us that it's you whenever you
re-enter our site, so we can recall where you've previously been on our site,
and what if anything, you have in your shopping cart.
Motorola.com Privacy Practices, at http://www.motorola.com/content/0,1037,3,00.html
(last visited Apr. 4, 2002). Hallmark's site provides another example:
An IP [Internet Protocol] address is a number that is assigned to your com-
puter when you are using your browser on the Internet. The servers that
serve our Web site automatically identify your computer by its IP address.
We do log IP addresses, but the addresses are not linked to individual cus-
tomer accounts nor are they used in any other way to personally identify our
customers.
Hallmark.com Privacy Policy, at http://www.hallmark.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
84. The Kinko's Security and Privacy Policy states:
Also, Kinkos uses a reputable third party to collect and accumulate other
anonymous data that helps us understand and analyze the Internet experi-
ence of our visitors.... This information may be stored in a cookie on your
computer's hard drive. However, none of this information is personally identi-
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other words, although sites keep records of cookie-generated in-
formation, they claim not to keep track of which person is at-
tached to this information.
Perhaps the most significant challenge to adequate notice
arises regarding the relationships that sites have with third par-
ties. Privacy advocates and consumers are especially concerned
about the fact that personal data may be transferred to these
third parties.8 5 Privacy policies refer to these entities as "trust-
worthy third parties"6 or "reputable third-parties,""7 etc. The
main challenge to giving effective notice is the complexity and di-
versity of the relationships that sites have with these third par-
ties. The difficult issue is determining how much description is
necessary in order to provide adequate notice. Some sites are
moving in the direction of providing fuller descriptions of their re-
lationships with third parties. This means, however, that their
privacy policies are becoming increasingly long and complex.
The second of the privacy norms is choice/consent. 8 The intui-
tive idea is that users should have some say when it comes to the
use of their personal information by Web sites. The FTC has in-
terpreted the norm of choice so as to include making a choice
among a number of alternatives. 9 Some sites, however, treat
choice in the narrowest sense so as to mean simple consent or as-
sent. Toyota writes, "[bly using this site, you signify your assent
to the Toyota Online Privacy Policy. If you do not agree to this
policy, please do not use this site."9 ° Under the heading of "[y]our
fiable and we only share this information in the aggregate, reflecting overall
Web site or Internet usage trends.
Kinko's Security and Privacy Policy, at http/-www.kinkos.com/globaLassetsdocs/pri-
vacy.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
85. See Jason Gonzalez, Better Business Bureau Gives Nod to Lowe's, NAT'L HOMiE
CENTER NEWS, May 1, 2001, at 7 ("The posted policy must also include product informa-
tion, data access, site security and third party transfer information-perhaps the primary
concern among consumers and privacy advocates.").
86. See Barnes & Noble.corn Privacy Policy, at http/vww.barnesandnoble.com/help/
nc.privacy-policy.asp (last revised May 3, 2001).
87. See Nokia.com Privacy Policy, at http://www.nokia.com/privacy.html (last updated
Jan. 2, 2002).
88. See FTC 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 27, at 8.
89. See id. at 8-9.
90. Toyota.com Privacy Policy, supra note 73.
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Consent" on its site, Nike simply states, "[b]y using our Web site,
you consent to our privacy policy."9
Many sites, however, offer users choices other than the option
of leaving. The most common choice made available to users is
whether they want to have the site store and use their personal
data. Many sites give the user the option of removing their per-
sonal data from the site. For example, Kinkos.com states, "[y]ou
can easily change any of the information you have been asked to
provide by Kinko's. You can also permanently remove your infor-
mation from the Kinko's database."92
As already mentioned, Web sites offer two types of consent that
are commonly referred to as opt-in and opt-out.9 3 With opt-out,
the user must take some positive step in order to stop what would
otherwise be a default process whereby his or her data would be
available for use by the Web site.9 4 Typically, the user cannot
simply opt-out without consequence. Sites often condition access
to the site or to some portion of the site on the provision that the
consumer supply data. Thus, opting out of the provision entails
opting out of receiving some or all of the site's services. Other
sites, however, simply allow consumers to opt out of at least some
of the site's collection practices without adversely affecting the
consumers' abilities to benefit from the site.96 Until recently, it
has been uncommon for Web sites to provide opt-in as a choice to
users. A small but growing number of sites are now offering users
the choice to opt-in to some or all of the site's data practices. In
particular, sites that deal with more sensitive data are beginning
to offer users the choice to opt-in for this data.97
91. Nike's Online Privacy Policy, supra note 67.
92. Kinko's Security and Privacy Policy, supra note 84.
93. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 42.
95. See Motorola.com Privacy Practices, supra note 83.
You also have choices with respect to cookies. By modifying your browser
preferences, you have the choice to accept all cookies, to be notified when a
cookie is set, or to reject all cookies. If you choose to reject all cookies you will
be unable to use those services or engage in activities that require the place-
ment of cookies.
Id.
96. See J.Crew.com Privacy, at http://www.jcrew.comlhelp.sniplets/privacynew.jhtml
(last modified Nov. 20, 2000) (permitting customers to refuse cookies and to decline receiv-
ing promotional emails and catalogs without limiting the customer's shopping experience).
97. See Paul Davidson, Capitol Hill Support Brews for Internet Privacy Laws, USA
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The third privacy norm prescribes that Web sites provide users
with access to their personal data stored with the Web site.9" This
principle is often discussed in conjunction with the principle of al-
lowing consumers to contest data stored at the site that they
deem to be incorrect. It is getting increasingly common for sites to
allow users to access their data. For example, Microsoft's Web
site states, "[i]f you ever want to review or update your profile,
simply visit the Profile Center and edit your personal informa-
tion. We'll ask you to disclose your Microsoft Passport (e-mail ad-
dress and password) so that only you can access your profile."99
Despite opportunities for access, fewer sites offer the ability to
contest data. One site that does is Nokia.com, which states that
"Nokia will on its own initiative, or at your request, replenish,
rectify or erase any incomplete, inaccurate or outdated personal
data."1
00
A solid minority of sites now address the issue of security in
their privacy policies. 10' Many sites employ Secure Socket Layer
("SSL") technology to protect the security of credit card informa-
tion as it is transmitted to the site.'0 2 With SSL, the Web site's
server scrambles the data as it travels from the user's computer
to the Web site. It is much less common, however, for sites to
make remarks in their privacy policies regarding the security of
the user's data as it resides on the site's server. This latter form
of security is more important than protecting the data while in
transit, as most significant breaches of Web site security have in-
volved hackers gaining access to databases. 1°' Increasingly, Web
TODAY, July 12, 2001, at 3B (arguing that there is consensus building for requiring opt-in
for more sensitive data, such as financial and medical).
98. See FTC 1998 PRiVAcY REPORT, supra note 27, at 9.
99. See Microsofi.com Statement of Privacy, at http//wvwwv.microsoft.com/info/privacy.
htm (last updated Feb. 23, 2001).
100. See Nokia.com Privacy Policy, supra note 87.
101. FTC 1998 PRiVACY REPORT, supra note 27, at 10.
102. See Motorola.com Privacy Practices, supra note 83.
Motorola uses Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption technology, the highest
level of security on the Internet. The SSL protocol provides server authenti-
cation, data integrity, and privacy on the Web. This security measure helps
ensure that no imposters, eavesdroppers, or vandals get your personal infor-
mation. SSL not only encrypts your personal and financial information
transmitted, including credit card information, but also verifies the identity
of the server and that the original message arrives safely at its destination.
Id.
103. Recently, a Russian hacker, Maxus, succeeded in stealing the credit card informa-
tion of a large number of consumers whose data was stored on a site. Maxus attempted to
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sites are addressing the issue of the security of data stored by the
site. Some sites are limiting the number of employees with access
to personally identifiable data, as well as employing security sys-
tems to protect the data from external intruders. °4
The fifth privacy norm is that of enforcement/redress."°5 Ac-
cording to this principle, the user should be provided with some
means of enforcing the above principles or of receiving redress in
cases of injury due to a Web site's failure to provide protective
practices."0 6 Web sites have done very little to promote this
norm.
10 7
2. Critique of Web Site Privacy Policies
As the previous discussion indicated, Web sites have been ac-
tive to one degree or another in the past few years in implement-
ing various sorts of privacy practices. These activities have
emerged in response to increased demands of consumers and
various privacy advocates. Although these practices regard pri-
vacy, it is debatable whether they actually respect or enhance
privacy. The practices have been subject to harsh criticism from
privacy advocates, who have in general claimed that the level of
extract $100,000 from the site. When they refused to pay, he posted the information for
public display on the Internet. See Jeffrey KIluger, Extortion on the Internet, TIME, Jan. 24,
2000, at 56.
104. For example, MTV's Web site, MTV.com, states, "[wie have taken steps to ensure
that personally identifiable information collected is secure, including limiting the number
of people who have physical access to its database servers, as well as electronic security
systems and password protections which guard against unauthorized access." MTV.com
Terms of Use & Privacy Policy, at http://www.mtv.com/sitewidelmtvinfo/terms.jhtml (last
updated Aug. 9, 2001) ("To ensure that your information is even more secure, once we re-
ceive your credit card information, we store it on a server that isn't accessible from the
Internet."). See also Barnes & Noble.com Privacy Policy, supra note 86; Microsoft.com
Statement of Privacy, supra note 99 ("[Dlata is stored in password-controlled servers with
limited access.").
105. FTC 1998 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 27, at 10-11.
106. Id.
107. For a token effort, Barnes & Noble.com:
We're so certain that our online ordering systems are secure that we back it
up with a guarantee. In the unlikely event that you are subject to fraudulent
charges.... [we] will cover the entire liability for you, up to $50, as long as
the unauthorized use of your credit card resulted through no fault of your
own from purchases made from Barnes & Noble.corn while using our secure
server.
Barnes & Noble.com Privacy Policy, supra note 86.
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protection provided by Web sites is far too low to provide ade-
quate respect for consumer data privacy rights.' 8
In addition to expressing dissatisfaction with the general level
of protection, privacy advocates have sharply attacked Web sites
for acting in a duplicitous fashion by seeking to create a false im-
pression in consumers.0 9 Nearly all the criticism has been leveled
against the main form of protection to be offered so far, the pri-
vacy policy. The general drift of criticism leveled by commenta-
tors is that privacy policies are vague, unintelligible, and incom-
plete." ° Readers are naturally led to believe they are getting
greater protection than they in fact are.
This criticism of emerging Web site privacy norms is typically
painted with a broad brush, dismissing in its entirety efforts by
Web sites to provide respect for privacy. If these critics are right
in the categorical dismissal of the efforts of Web sites, a puzzle
arises when this dismissal is considered in light of the above dis-
cussion. The puzzle is to explain why no supply of privacy has
been forthcoming, given the increase in demand. As noted earlier,
unless there are special circumstances, an increase in demand
should bring about an increase in supply. If the critics are right,
this has not occurred. What, then, are the special circumstances
that occasion this outcome?
In spite of the widespread rejection of privacy policy protections
by privacy advocates-or perhaps because of it-there has been
little detailed examination of the particular norms that have been
promoted in privacy policies in order to better evaluate whether
the categorical rejection is accurate. Accordingly, further progress
in understanding this important issue will necessitate closer ex-
amination-from a critical perspective-of the industry norms
that have emerged thus far. A discussion of the various aspects of
privacy policies that highlight their most troubling features fol-
lows.
108. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Consumer Privacy in Electronic Commerce: As the Mil-
lenium Approached, Minnesota Attacked, Regulators Refrained, and Congress Compro-
mised, 14 NOTRE DAMoE J.L. ETmcs & PUB. POLY 821, 823 (2000).
109. Id. at 824-25.
110. See, e.g., Patrick Thibodeau, FTC Official Faults Corporate Privacy Policies,
COMPUTERWORLD, May 7, 2001, at 12 ("Many corporate privacy policies are too hard to
find, too long and too confusing....") (paraphrasing U.S. Federal Trade Commissioner
Sheila Anthony).
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As noted earlier, the one principle that is most often addressed
by Web sites is notice, so discussion may usefully begin here."'
All privacy policies, to one degree or another, describe the Web
site's data practices, but when do such descriptions constitute
adequate notice? The better Web sites make statements telling
the user that the notice provided by the Web site is exhaustive of
the uses to which the consumer's data will be put. The Wal-
mart.com policy states, "[w]e value your trust very highly, and
pledge to you, our customer, that we will work to protect the se-
curity and privacy of any personal information you provide to us
and that your personal information will only be used as set forth
in this Policy."" 2 On the other hand, more lax Web sites merely
note, at most, that they will make an effort to inform users of the
sites' collection and usage practices. For instance, MTV.com says
it makes "good faith efforts to make it clear why the information
is being collected and what it will be used for."" 3 In the event of
litigation against MTV, the firm will always be able to assert that
it made a good faith effort given the circumstances. Wal-Mart's
promise is more concrete; it either is, or is not, the case that the
user's data is used by the Web site in a manner set forth in the
policy.1
14
Even for Web sites such as Walmart.com that appear genuinely
interested in providing fair notice, this requirement is not with-
out difficulties. There will inevitably be some deficit in reader
comprehension simply because privacy policies may present a
host of new terminology and a set of descriptions of varying and
complex practices. This is a familiar problem with consumer con-
tracts, leases, disclaimers, etc. With privacy policies, however, the
failure to comprehend may be due more to unfamiliar terminology
and processes than to complex legal constructions, although, as
noted above, privacy policies are becoming more legalistic as well.
111. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
112. Walmart.com Privacy Policy, supra note 66; see also Intel.com Privacy Policy, at
http://www.intel.com/sites/corporate/privacy.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2002) (stating that
"Intel is committed to user privacy in our products and services. This policy outlines our
personal information handling practices. If you give us personal information, we will treat
it according to this policy"); Microsoft.com Statement of Privacy, supra note 99 ("For mate-
rial changes to this statement, Microsoft.com will notify you by placing prominent notice
on the Web site.").
113. See MTV.com Terms of Use and Privacy Policy, supra note 104.
114. See Walmart.com Privacy Policy, supra note 66.
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There is no neat solution to this difficulty, which is inherent in
giving notice to ordinary people of complex activities with signifi-
cant legal implications. Even Web sites making their best effort
will need to make difficult judgment calls regarding the proper
level of information to provide. If the notice is too detailed, the
reader may become lost or distracted, and if the notice is too
pithy, the reader may not receive adequate information." 5
Many Web sites appear not to make a best effort, however, or
anything close to it. For example, many Web sites state that they
reserve the right to change their data practices without prior no-
tice."6 These Web sites typically instruct users that they should
periodically consult the site's privacy policy in order to stay ap-
prised of the site's current data policies."' The obvious problem
with this suggestion is that in the time between when the user
checks the policy and the time of the policy change, she will be
misinformed as to the Web site's practices. In addition, this prac-
tice creates an incentive for Web sites to promise respectful
treatment to users in order to lure them in, only to then change
practices in midstream."'
The deepest fear for consumers involves the use of their data
by unknown third parties using their data in unknown ways." 9
People expect that their data will be used only for the purpose for
which it is collected. By the lights of ordinary moral logic, this
would imply that Web sites have a duty to adequately inform us-
ers of external uses of their data. It is thus here that Web sites
have their greatest opportunity to either display respect or not.
However, it is in this area that Web sites are perhaps most guilty
115. See Thibodeau, supra note 110, at 12 (describing how Citibank is dealing with this
problem by offering two versions of its privacy policy, the technical one and the short
form).
116. See, e.g., MTV.com Terms of Use and Privacy Policy, supra note 104.
117. Id.
118. Many sites note that they collect personal information using cookies but that this
information is not connected up to personally identifiable information. For example, kin-
kos.com states that "Kinko's does not link your IP address with any information that could
personally identify you." Kinko's Security & Privacy Policy, supra note 84. But the Web
site also states that "Kinko's reserves the right, at its sole discretion, to make modifica-
tions, alterations or updates to this Privacy Policy at any time." Id. In other words, Kinko's
could at any time change its policy and begin to link up cookie data with personal informa-
tion. This is precisely what DoubleClick proposed to do before they changed their plans in
the face of heavy criticism. See FTC Lets DoubleClick Off the Hook on Info-Sharing
Charge, 2 E-Bus. L. BULL. (Andrews Publ'ns, Inc.) No. 5, at 12 (Mar. 2001).
119. See Gonzalez, supra note 85, at 7.
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of providing inadequate notice. Web sites commonly note that
they will deal with third parties in order to promote the interests
of users. 120 This vague fiduciary language is likely to be mislead-
ing, however. The warm and fuzzy labels and phrases used by
Web sites to describe their relationships with unnamed third par-
ties deceptively hide the fact that most Web sites use language
that leaves them completely open to deal with anyone in any
manner that they please. There is no evidence and little reason to
believe that many Web sites restrict their activities with third
parties to only those that promote their users' interests. 121 Some
of the better Web sites are beginning to provide more detailed ex-
planations of their dealings with third parties.122
The second privacy norm is choice and consent. This principle
is connected to the first principle of notice in that when notice is
inadequate, consent will be inadequate as well. One cannot con-
sent to what one does not know about. Thus, as a matter of the
normative logic of privacy policies, unless a Web site demon-
strates a reasonable degree of respect with regard to the provision
of notice, the Web site cannot demonstrate a reasonable degree of
respect with regard to the principle of choice/consent.
120. See, e.g., Amazon.com Privacy Notice, at http://www.amazon.com (last visited Mar.
21, 2002).
121. Numerous sites have demonstrated a flagrant lack of discrimination in their deal-
ings with third parties. The Electronic Frontier Foundation launched a campaign in early
June 2001, against Macys.com for disclaiming information from its bridal registry to its
business partners. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Frontier Foundation Ac-
tion Alert: Contact Macy's Now! Tell Them to Respect Your Privacy (June 5, 2001), at
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Marketing/20010612_effmacys-alert.html. Toysmart.com ex-
plicitly promised not to sell data: "[plersonal information voluntarily submitted by visi-
tors.., is never shared with a third party." Toysmart.com Privacy Statement, at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/toyexhl.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002). In bankruptcy,
Toysmart then attempted to sell this data. See Judge Is Urged to Reject Toysmart.com Set-
tlement, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2000, at B2; Toysmart.com's Plan to Sell Customer Data Is
Challenged by FTC, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2000, at C8; Press Release, FTC Announces Set-
tlement With Bankrupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy Viola-
tions (July 21, 2000), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.htm. In addition, Toys-
mart faced a lawsuit filed by TRUSTe, which contended that Toysmart was in violation of
its online agreement not to sell consumer data to third parties. See generally Elinor Abreu,
TRUSTe to File Antiprivacy Brief Against Toysmart, INDUSTRY STANDARD, June 30, 2000,
available at http://www.thestandard.com/articledisplay/0,1151,16577,00.html.
122. Wal-Mart, for example, describes its dealings with Coremetrics and other third
parties. See Walmart.com Privacy Policy, supra note 66. Once users possess these fuller
descriptions, they will be in a position to decide for themselves whether the data transfers
are for their benefit.
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As discussed previously, the crucial issue regarding the princi-
ple of choice/consent is between opt-in and opt-out.123 The criti-
cism of opt-out is that it puts the default in the wrong place. The
reality of opt-out is that most users do not read and study privacy
policies. Thus, most users will not in fact opt-out. But this does
not mean that they have actually consented to the data policies of
the Web site, but merely that they have not read the privacy pol-
icy. Thus, it can be argued that if Web sites were truly respectful,
they would not collect and use consumer data unless they had ac-
tual consent.
Web sites can argue with some plausibility, however, that opt-
in is unduly restrictive in that most consumers do not mind hav-
ing their data collected and used by Web sites. Thus, opt-in would
create an artificially high burden on all those users who prefer
receiving the benefits that various Web sites have to offer but
who do not bother to read privacy policies. In an article discussing
junk mail, Richard Posner argued that opt-out was more efficient
than opt-in.124 Similarly, the Web site industry might argue that
it is actually doing consumers a favor to have opt-out instead of
opt-in because the former policy will promote efficiency.
Some sites arguably frustrate true consent by making choices
more difficult than they need be. For example, 1-800-
FLOWERS.COM states, "[i]f you prefer not to have us provide
personal information collected from you to third parties... ,
please let us know by either: [e-mailing or writing them]."25 Note
that the Web site does not say to call despite the fact that the
name of the company is 1-800-FLOWERS. The site appears not to
want to make it easy to opt-out.
The third privacy norm is that users should both have access to
their data and the ability to remove incorrect data. As discussed
earlier, a growing number of Web sites are allowing users some
123. Many Web sites' privacy policies are drafted in such a manner, either intention-
ally or negligently, that the reader cannot discern if the operative practice is opt-in or opt-
out. For example, Hallmarkcom states: "[w]e do not currently share your customer contact
information with third parties for promotional purposes, and we will only do so in the fu-
ture with your prior approval via email notification." Hallmark.com Privacy Policy, supra
note 83. It is not clear, however, whether "prior approval" means prior explicit approval or
merely the failure to opt-out when notice is provided.
124. See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 398 (1978).
125. About 1-800-FLOWERS.COM: Your Privacy, supra note 65.
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version of these features. 126 What these Web sites do not typically
explain, however, is that this access is usually only to so-called
personally identifiable data--data explicitly gathered from the
user. This means that the clickstream data collected about the
user by means of cookies is not available to the consumer to ac-
cess or remove. A Web site might say in its own defense that
clickstream data is not personally identifiable, and consequently
there is no basis for user concern, and thus no reason to provide
access or the ability to remove the data. But there is always the
possibility that clickstream data can be linked back to users, ei-
ther by the Web site that collects the data or from some other
Web site that gains possession of such data.'27 Thus, while the
clickstream data is not currently personally identifiable, it may
be in the future. Respectful Web sites might therefore provide ac-
cess to clickstream data not to mention notice of the potential
combination of so-called anonymous data with user's personal
identity.
The fourth privacy norm is security. As noted earlier, some
Web sites provide SSL protection for personal data while in tran-
sit to the Web site. 12 Other Web sites provide some protection for
the data while in storage at the Web site, such as by encrypting
the data or restricting employee access to the data.129 While these
protections are beneficial, most Web sites do not address the
main threat to the security of user data: the loss of control over
the data due to voluntary alienation to third parties. In addition,
other sites allow third parties to collect user data but take no re-
sponsibility for the actions of these third parties. 3 ° It is as if Web
sites padlock the backdoor to keep the illegal hackers out but
leave the front door wide open for any third party with the means
126. See discussion supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
127. See DoubleClick Faces Mich. Atty. Gen. Probe and Numerous Privacy Suits,
COMPUTER & ONLINE INDuS. LITIG. REP., Mar. 7, 2000, at 7. For instance, in June 1999,
DoubleClick acquired Abacus Direct Corp., a direct marketing company that maintains an
enormous database of names, telephone numbers, addresses, and purchasing information
on millions of people. Id. DoubleClick has matched its 'clickstream' data with personally
identifiable information gleaned from the Abacus database to form personally identifiable
profiles of the Internet surfing and purchasing habits of millions of individuals. Id.
128. See supra text accompanying note 102.
129. See, e.g., Microsofticom Statement of Privacy, supra note 99.
130. See, e.g., Kinko's Security and Privacy Policy, supra note 84 ("Some of Kinko's
strategic partners, such as those with links on our Web site, also use cookies, but Kinko's
is not responsible for the abuse or misuse of any information gathered through the use of
cookies by such third parties.").
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to walk in, conduct a transaction, and leave with the data in
hand.
In sum, the above examination demonstrates that thus far Web
sites have talked the talk of data privacy but have not adequately
walked the walk. With this detailed look at Web site privacy
norms in mind, it is now possible to fully consider whether Pos-
ner's theory provides the best explanation for norms emergence.
III. SIGNALING VERSUS COOPERATION AccouNTs OF WEB SITE
PRIVACY NORMS
The relative dearth of substantive privacy protections provided
by the Web site industry raises the question of why the increased
demand for privacy has not resulted in a more robust supply of
privacy protections on the part of Web sites. One possible answer
is that the level of demand thus far has not been sufficiently
strong to elicit greater supply. In other words, despite the best ef-
forts of privacy norm proselytizers, consumer demand has simply
not been sufficient to drive Web sites into a more aggressive pos-
ture in terms of providing more respectful practices.
While this is one possible answer, it suffers from the fault that
it appears to leave unexplained the deceptive nature of the re-
sponse on the part of many Web sites. If there is so little demand
for online privacy, why go to the bother of attempting to create
the impression that a Web site is committed to respect user pri-
vacy? Why not just avoid dealing with the topic altogether, as any
firm must do with a myriad of issues that have a marginal impact
on its business? Thus, a more satisfactory explanation of the Web
site industry response must explain why Web sites bother to re-
spond in a deceptive manner.
One type of explanation that naturally suggests itself is a sig-
naling model. Signaling models seek to explain the manner by
which words and deeds can serve a signaling function.'' A party
wishing to communicate a proposition through signaling, rather
than merely asserting the proposition, will use words or deeds
calculated to elicit the inference that the proposition is true."3 2
131. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER, & RANDAL C. PICKER,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 123-24 (1994).
132. See id. at 123 ("Signaling takes place when those who possess nonverifiable infor-
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For example, warranties may be used to communicate that a
product is of high quality. The signal works because the sellers of
the higher quality products are able to more cheaply send the
signal.'33 In the warranty example, Baird, Gertner, and Picker
explain: "High quality sellers may be able to signal their type by
selling goods with a warranty. Because their goods break down
less often, these sellers can offer a warranty more cheaply than
low-quality sellers."'34
Perhaps the reason that the words and deeds of many Web
sites appear to be motivated by the desire to deceive, rather than
to provide respect, is that Web sites are motivated by the desire
to falsely signal privacy rather than provide it. The first section
below will apply Posner's general signaling account to Web site
data norms. The next section will critique this account.
A. Signaling Theory Applied to Privacy Norms
A possible explanation of the apparently deceptive actions of
Web sites is suggested by Posner's signaling theory of norms."'
Recall that for Posner, a norm is simply a pattern of behavior
comprising individual signaling behaviors of actors seeking to
signal that they are good types.' 36 On this account, emerging Web
site privacy norms are best explained as attempts to signal to us-
ers that the participating Web sites are good types. Web sites
that are good types have low discount rates; that is, they do not
highly discount the value of future utility in comparison to pre-
sent utility. Thus, they are more likely to enter into cooperative
relationships that promote future utility despite a sacrifice of
present utility.
The relevant norms are the patterns of behavior whereby Web
sites are addressing user privacy concerns by offering privacy
policies with varying elements of notice, choice, access, security,
and enforcement. Good types desire a situation in which they are
able to establish a separating equilibrium and serve as the only
participant in these practices. However, the situation appears to
mation can convey that information in the way they choose their actions.").
133. Id. at 124.
134. Id.
135. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 18-22.
136. Id. at 19.
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vary depending on the particular norm. For the norm of providing
notice of data-related practices, it appears that instead of a sepa-
rating equilibrium, there exists a pooling equilibrium in which
most Web sites follow this norm or are inclined to do so in the fu-
ture. 7 Web site behavior appears to be moving in this direction
for the practice of providing choice, at least when choice is under-
stood in a less demanding sense so as to include opt-out. Thus, a
pooling equilibrium has formed or is quickly forming for these
two norms. Consequently, the good types are not able to distin-
guish themselves from the bad types by means of the signals cre-
ated by participating in these norms. 3 '
Note, however, that for the norms of opt-in, security measures,
and access, it does appear that separating equilibria have formed,
whereby some Web sites conform to these norms while other Web
sites do not. One way to interpret these new norms is that they
are attempts by good types to find signals that are more costly
and not so susceptible to becoming pooling equilibria. Web sites
that conform to more demanding norms display a willingness to
expend costs in signaling at a level that is apparently not sus-
tainable by most Web sites. Indeed, one conspicuous feature dis-
tinguishing these latter norms is that they are costly. For exam-
ple, an opt-in policy is costly in terms of opportunity costs. The
137. A separating equilibrium previously existed. According to the FTC's 1998 study,
only fourteen percent of Web sites disclosed their information practices. See FTC 1998
PRIVAGY REPORT, supra note 27, at 27. However, in 1999 the Georgetown Internet Privacy
Policy Survey Report indicated that sixty-one percent of Web sites posted at least one dis-
closure about their information practices. See FTC 2000 PRIVAcY REPORT, supra note 76,
at 10. The 2000 FTC Report indicated that eighty-eight percent of the surveyed sites
posted at least one disclosure about their information practices. See id.
138. To effectively carry out the false signaling strategy, one must be able to appear
cooperative when, in fact, one is not. Note that this activity appears to be especially easy
in the context of Web site personal data practices, due to the complex nature of these prac-
tices and the extent to which such practices are invisible to consumers. In this respect,
these practices differ from exemplars of the cooperative model. For instance, one of Ellick-
son's main examples involves interactions between neighbors over the provision of border
fences. See ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 65-81; see also POSNER, supra note 1, at 173. Im-
plicit in this example is the fact that one party's cooperation is verifiable by the other
party. ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 65-81. Each party knows whether the other party is
doing its share to bring about the cooperative good because failure to cooperate will be
readily apparent. Id. With respect to online privacy, however, this is not the case. A user is
not typically in a position to verify whether the notice provided by a site of its data-related
practices is indeed an exhaustive account. This difficulty of verification allows room for
false signaling. It may be difficult to signal that one will be a cooperative fence builder
without actually building a fence, but one may signal that one is a privacy respecter with-
out actually respecting privacy.
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Web site forgoes the opportunity to gain access to data for free.
The costs are more direct for providing access and ability to con-
test data. 139 Similarly, the costs of security measures also are di-
rect and come from the cost of supplying the security. 40
Thus, some Web sites conform to norms that cost them signifi-
cantly. Posner's account provides a possible explanation as to why
these sites have shown an interest in providing more costly forms
of regard for consumer data. The motivation is to signal that they
are good types in a manner that is not easily duplicated by bad
types, thereby enabling the good types to establish a separating
equilibrium for the more costly practices.
B. Signaling a Respectful Disposition
It may not be so simple, however, to apply Posner's model to
explain the response of Web sites to the heightened concern for
consumer online privacy. There appears to be an important dif-
ference between norms as characterized in Posner's model and
the norms that arise in the context of Web site privacy-regarding
activities.
Contrary to the suggestion of Posner's model, many Web sites
are not best characterized as seeking to signal that they are good
types; they are in fact taking steps that would be required of good
types. Thus, their behavior is best understood not as signaling a
discount rate conducive to future cooperative acts, but as actually
engaging in cooperative acts. Posner's model is, in effect, always
looking ahead to a future of cooperation after the signaling is
139. "Among the questions the [2000 FTC] report raises is whether the costs of ac-
cess-measured by money, convenience or privacy risks-would be too high, for businesses
and consumers alike." Web Privacy Task Force Split on Need for Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 2000, at C4.
140. See FTC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ONLINE ACCESS AND SECURITY, FINAL REPORT
19 (2000) ("Security--and the resulting protection for personal data--can be set at almost
any level depending on the costs one is willing to incur, not only in dollars but in inconven-
ience for users and administrators of the system."), available at http://vww.ftc.gov/acoas/
papers/finalreport.htm (May 15, 2000); see also Craig Eddy, A Critical Analysis of Health
and Human Services Proposed Health Privacy Regulations in Light of the Health Insur-
ance Privacy Accountability Act of 1996, 9 ANN. HEALTH L. 1, 29 (2000) (discussing the
privacy protection required by the Health Improvement and Accountability Act, whereby
the analysis of the costs of such protections can be applied to all Web sites). See generally
Ellen Messmer, FTC Hearings Spotlight 'Net Privacy,' NETWORK WORLD. June 16, 1997, at
6.
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complete. But in fact some Web sites have already taken signifi-
cant steps to begin cooperative relationships with users. Posner
errs, then, by using signaling of discount rates as the sole expla-
nation for norms." Online privacy norms constitute an important
example in which norms are not collections of actions intended to
signal discount rates, but rather collections of actions intended
either to provide respect to consumers in the hope of garnering
their trust, or to simulate respect also in the hope of garnering
consumer trust.
1. An Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Model of User/Web Site
Cooperation
As already noted, Web sites are increasingly offering privacy
protections to consumers despite the fact that they might legally
refrain from doing so. There are costs associated with offering
privacy protections. 43 Thus, assuming Web sites to be rational,
an explanation is necessary as to what benefit they hope to gain
as an offset to this cost. One possibility is the signaling account
explored above."'" Another possibility is that Web sites are seek-
ing to enter into repeat-play cooperative relationships with their
customers that can be modeled as iterated prisoner's dilemmas.'45
This explanation would make sense of the genuinely sacrificial
behavior of some Web sites; they are incurring costs in the near
term, the current game, in order to thereby entreat consumers to
find them desirable partners with whom to enter into longer-term
interactions or repeat games.'46 Each party has the opportunity to
defect in the first round of a game. Defection is the dominant
strategy in a single-shot game; each party does best by defecting
regardless of the choice made by the other party. However, when
there is an opportunity for the parties to interact over time in a
repeat game situation, it may be rational for each party to adopt
141. Posner apparently intends his account of norms to be an account of all norms, that
is, all norms can be explained as signaling equilibria. See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling
Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 654 (2001)
(reviewing POSNER, supra note 1) ("I think it [is] fair to read Posner as offering signal-
ing... as a general account of social norms.").
142. See supra Part II.B.
143. See supra notes 139-40.
144. See supra Part I.
145. Hetcher, supra note 30, at 921-24.
146. Id.
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a cooperative strategy in which each defers the immediate gain
from defection in order to realize long-term gains that may result
from cooperation.'47
This account faces a serious limitation, however, in that it may
fail to explain the behavior of many and perhaps most Web sites.
As discussed above, a prevalent complaint among privacy advo-
cates about current Web site practices is that Web sites are not
serious about privacy. 48 In terms of the potential cooperative
bargain between users and Web sites whereby trust is exchanged
for respect, this criticism can be recast in terms of seeing Web
sites as trying to get something for nothing. They are seeking to
obtain trust not by exchanging privacy protection, but through
the illusion of privacy protection. If this charge is accurate, it
suggests that something unusual is going on. In the usual model
of cooperation, when a rational actor forgoes a short-term gain in
the hopes of thereby securing a long-term gain, she really forgoes
the short-term gain. The implication of the privacy activists cri-
tique, however, is that Web sites are often not forgoing the short-
term gain.
One possible explanation is that these Web sites merely seek to
pretend that they are interested in respecting user privacy. There
may be good reason for a Web site to act in this duplicitous man-
ner. The obvious reason is that the deceptive acts may fool users,
such that they mistake the pretense for reality. These users may
then cooperate with the Web site, thinking that the Web site is
cooperating with them. Thus, deception appears to be a highly
desirable strategy; the Web site gains the benefits of being a co-
operator without incurring the costs of being a cooperator.1 49 Un-
147. This point was illustrated by Robert Axelrod's computer tournaments. See
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-15 (1984). When a prisoner's di-
lemma game is repeated, and if the incentive to defect is no longer dominant because de-
fection may provoke the other side to defect in future rounds, cooperation may induce co-
operation. See id. at 12. If the parties care enough about the future, the discounted benefit
from mutual cooperation in future rounds may exceed the immediate benefit from defect-
ing. See id. Cooperation is not the dominant strategy, however, because that strategy is
easily exploited by strategies that always defect. See id. at 9. Even conditional cooperation
like the tit-for-tat strategy that won the Axelrod tournament is not dominant. See id. at
13-14. But the well-established result is that repetition of the game makes cooperation
possible; sustained conditional cooperation is one possible equilibrium for the repeated
game. See id. at 12.
148. See text accompanying supra note 109.
149. As the old saying in moral theory goes, "[aill the advantages of theft over honest
toil."
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derstanding the actions of many Web sites, then, may require de-
termining whether they are best understood as seeking to simu-
late respect in order to trick users into turning over their data.
Cooperation in a repeat game is a better description of what oc-
curs with some Web sites, however, for sometimes they incur sig-
nificant short-term costs in order to provide privacy protections.
For example, when a Web site provides an opt-in policy, therefore
guaranteeing that it will not transfer data to third parties, and
then provides access and redress, or provides heightened security,
the Web site incurs real costs. These costs are distinct from those
that may be incurred by Web sites that are only interested in sig-
naling a low discount rate. With Posner's signaling account, there
is no cost associated with actually engaging in the cooperative re-
lationship, as the actual cooperation is in the future. Web sites
that are actually incurring real costs as part of an already ongo-
ing cooperative relationship have moved beyond merely signaling
and are actually playing out the cooperative endeavor.150
For the reasons discussed in Part Two, consumers increasingly
feel entitled to respect and will trust Web sites that demonstrate
they are worthy of trust. Consumers may not view their relation-
ship with Web sites as strategic until they perceive it as a moral
relationship. But once consumers perceive Web sites as either re-
specting or disrespecting them, they will consequently trust or
distrust them. The more strongly consumers feel about data pri-
vacy entitlement, the more they will be morally affronted by in-
stances where Web sites disrespect their privacy. Accordingly,
they will be slower to trust Web sites and will be more inclined to
retaliate against those that fail to show respect. 5'
150. The notion of Web site visitors choosing to trust Web sites is similar to Richard
McAdams's idea that actors can choose whether to esteem another party with whom they
are interacting. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355-72 (1997). Note, however, that whereas McAdams plau-
sibly contends that the desire for esteem is a brute preference that a rational actor might
have for its own sake, trust is not an item that Web sites would independently desire. Id.
at 355-56. Rather, a Web site would prefer to gain the trust of its visitors because this
trust will be positively correlated with these visitors choosing to interact with the Web site
in the future. Robert Cooter's internalization account of norm conformity appears not to
play a role as Web sites are commercial enterprises that are not readily susceptible to the
psychological phenomenon of internalization. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for
a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1694-95 (1996).
151. Retaliation may take a variety of forms, such as engaging in negative gossip or
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The situation is strategic because Web sites are in a position to
choose whether to respect the consumer in order to potentially
engender consumer trust. Part of the Web site's choice whether to
show respect depends in part on its calculation of how much its
choice will cause the consumer to trust the Web site and how
much the resultant cooperative opportunities are worth to the
Web site.52 The strategic structure of the situation is represented
in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Web Site/Consumer Interaction
Web Site
No PrivacyPrivacy Norms Norms
Consumer
Trust 3,3 1,4
No Trust 4,1 2,2
Each party has two choices that affect the utility of the other
party.153 Each party must consider how its choice and the choice
providing false or misleading information to the Web site. In this regard, one author notes
the following:
The obvious product of this distrust is that people avoid disclosing personal
information by opting against online transactions and Web site registration.
Less obvious but equally troubling for online marketers is the "garbage in"
syndrome: in two recent surveys, over forty percent of Americans who regis-
tered at Web sites admitted to providing false information some of the time,
mainly because of privacy concerns; the figure for European registrants was
over fifty-eight percent .... The message to marketers is clear: if you want
useful and accurate data, earn it by assuring consumers that you will use it
appropriately.
Scott Killingsworth, Minding Your Own Business: Privacy Policies in Principle and in
Practice, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 62 (1999).
152. Prior to the bursting of the Internet bubble, the mere eventuality of future visits
to the site in itself was money in the bank, as Internet companies were valued in the mar-
ket in important part based on the number of"hits" the site received.
153. The numbers represent the ordinal preference rankings of the players, with "1"
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of the other party will affect its payoff. This means that each
party will consider whether it can affect the other's choice to im-
prove his own outcome. Specifically, the Web site will consider
whether it should attempt to foster consumer trust, and the con-
sumer will consider whether it can influence the Web site's choice
to provide privacy.
Because of these strategically interactive choices, a greater
number of Web sites may find it in their interest to respect pri-
vacy in order to maintain the trust of the increasingly educated
and demanding consumer. As recently as a few years ago, only a
minority of Web sites-the larger and better-known ones-offered
privacy policies.'54 This makes sense because these Web sites are
most likely to have overlapping, multifaceted interactions with
consumers; thus making it crucial for these Web sites to have re-
spectful and trustworthy reputations. The number of Web sites
that show respect for privacy has continued to grow as public con-
sciousness of online privacy has grown.' 55
2. Mimicking Respectful Privacy Policies
Although Posner's signaling model may fail to account for the
genuinely cooperative behavior taking place between some Web
sites and their users, an alternative signaling model may be ap-
propriate. As noted earlier, warranties are a standard example of
a signal.'56 Privacy policies may serve a parallel role to warran-
ties. In the privacy context, however, it is not necessarily, or typi-
cally, the case that one purchases a product from the Web site one
visits. The privacy relationship between Web sites and users,
then, is not inherently part of any transaction between these par-
being a player's least preferred outcome and "4" being a player's most preferred outcome.
Each pair of numbers represents the payoffs to each party for each of the four possible out-
comes. The left-hand number in each pair is the payoff to the row-player and the right-
hand number is the payoff for the column-player.
154. In the Federal Trade Commission's 1998 study, only fourteen percent of Web sites
were addressing consumer privacy issues. FTC 1998 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 27, at
27. As consumer sense of entitlement grows, the chances of plaintiffs' lawyers prevailing
in lawsuits grows. See Matt Fleischer, Click Here for More Web Suits: Lawyers Eye Privacy
Cases Against Many DoubleClick Rivals, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28, 2000, at Al (noting many
lawyers are now searching for the next privacy lawsuit against DoubleClick competitors,
such as Engage, 24/7 Media, MatchLogic, Flycast, and L90).
155. See FTC 1998 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 27, at 3-4, 28-29.
156. See BAIRD, GERTNER, & PICKER, supra note 131, at 124.
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ties. By contrast, warranties are part of the transaction between
buyer and seller. A better analogy may be drawn between the
online experience and the experience of customers while in the
store of a seller. For example, a customer may be surreptitiously
monitored while trying on apparel in the dressing room of a
store.
15 7
As discussed above, signals are used in situations in which the
potential signaler has nonverifiable information. The nonverifi-
able information that the Web site possesses and the user does
not is the Web site's privacy disposition, in other words, the level
of its commitment to respect consumer privacy, and its compe-
tence to fulfill this commitment. For example, Walmart.com's
disposition to be concerned for user privacy is stable in the sense
that Wal-Mart, the parent corporation, will continue to have an
important interest in its reputation with its customers.' 5 This
disposition is not readily knowable to the Web site's users, how-
ever. Accordingly, there is the possibility that the privacy policy
may be used to signal that this Web site has good privacy disposi-
tions. '
The reason warranties work as signals is because firms with
high-quality products can provide warranties more cheaply than
firms with low-quality products, as the high-quality products
break down less often. 6 ° Is the same true for privacy policies? In
other words, will Web sites with more respectful privacy disposi-
tions be able to offer privacy policies more cheaply? The answer is
yes. One can imagine two Web sites that each offer the same
157. See People v. Moreno, 135 Cal. Rptr. 340 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1976) (exam-
ining whether the actions of a security guard violate a customer's privacy when the guard
observes the customer through the slits of the dressing room door).
158. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. This is not to say that Wal-Mart's dis-
position is immutable. Walmart.com could be spun off, have a name change, and re-
emerge as a more aggressive data gatherer and user. While dispositions of a firm may be
less sticky than the dispositions of persons, what matters is not that such dispositions are
immutable but that they are relatively stable. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS
WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988) (discussing topics such as
signaling and cooperation and proposing that noble human tendencies may actually be
evolved traits).
159. Some people claim to be indifferent to the use of their personal data by Web sites.
They say things like, "I have nothing to hide," or, "I like the idea because it will lead to
more personalized marketing." Even a user who does not care whether her data is used by
Web sites might still rationally prefer to deal with a Web site that takes privacy seriously
because such a site would be signaling that it is interested in long-term relationships gen-
erally.
160. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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fairly rigorous privacy policy. Imagine further that one of these
Web sites-call it Wal-Mart-has more respectful privacy prac-
tices than another Web site-call it Toysmart. In these circum-
stances, Wal-Mart will be able to offer the privacy policy more
cheaply than Toysmart. When Toysmart provides the promise of
privacy protections, it must either take steps to live up to these
promises or take the chance of being liable for failing to do so.16
1
However, for Wal-Mart it is nearly costless to provide the privacy
policy as it is already providing the promised protection pursuant
to its cooperative relationship with consumers.
One might expect, then, that the Wal-Marts of cyberspace
would offer privacy policies while the Toysmarts of cyberspace
would not. However, this is not what has happened. Instead, pri-
vacy policies have become ubiquitous. The reason appears to be
that the less respectful Web sites do not duplicate the signal with
exactitude but rather mimic it with an inferior substitute, yet one
that is not readily discernable as inferior by the typical user. As
was seen in Part Two, many Web sites use deceptive language in
their privacy policies to create an impression among users that
they are being accorded a higher level of respect than is in fact
the case. To the average consumer, these privacy policies are not
readily distinguishable from the privacy policies of the more
genuinely respectful Web sites such as Wal-Mart's. This attempt
by some Web sites to offer privacy policies that superficially
mimic the better privacy policies, but are inferior in their details,
therefore is a plausible explanation for privacy policies that are
characterized by privacy activists as deceptive.
CONCLUSION
The previous discussion has sought to test Eric Posner's theory
of norm emergence. Though Posner does not implicitly say so, and
as Richard McAdams does say, it is fair to read him as offering a
general theory. As such, it should best explain the emergence of
all norms, including cyberspace norms. The examination above
indicates, however, that Web site privacy norms may not be best
explained as collections of signals by Web sites regarding their
discount rates. The privacy norms that have emerged are not col-
161. See supra note 121.
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lections of arbitrary actions that must only create separating
equilibria in order to work. Rather, the sets of actions are specifi-
cally targeted to either provide or to stimulate more respect for
consumer data privacy. In the case of some of these norms--opt-
in consent for example-the participating Web sites appear genu-
inely interested in entering into cooperative relationships with
consumers and have succeeded in doing so. Other privacy norms
are motley collections of genuine acts of cooperation on the one
hand, and false promises of cooperation on the other hand. The
fact that Posner's theory may not provide the best explanation of
emerging Web site privacy norms means only that it may not be a
general theory of norms. The theory nevertheless provides a con-
vincing and original account of other norms and, hence, is an im-
portant contribution to the norms literature.
